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Abstract 
This thesis studies the unilateral market power in wholesale electricity markets, its reasons and its 
extent. The study is constructed on a Cournot competition model. 
    I first go through the Cournot duopoly competition and then present the Cournot competition 
for n firms. I show that the Cournot equilibrium always settles between the competitive and the 
monopoly equilibriums. I then construct an electricity market specific duopoly game considering 
different marginal costs for different (base and peak load) capacities. I play five games, each with a 
slightly different setting. I prove that firms’ unilateral market power rises along with the marginal 
costs of electricity. When capacity gets more expensive firms have less incentives to offer it to the 
market and are therefore also more aware of their rival’s preferred strategies. I prove my point by 
presenting some of the most relevant previous empirical studies from two chosen markets, the 
United Kingdom and California. 
I study the British electricity market from its reform in 1990 until 2001. The empirical work 
shows that the market power abuse was maintained at a very low level in Britain’s duopolistic 
market thanks to strict regulation. However evidence of collusive behavior towards the end of the 
decade is strong. Also evidence for regulation-responding behavior is found. 
I also examine California’s electricity market during its crisis in 1998-2000. Researchers have 
found that large part of the increase in electricity’s wholesale prices was due to decreased hydroe-
lectric energy input, increased natural gas price and increased demand. However strong evidence 
of capacity withholding exists and the hypothesis for market power abuse cannot be rejected. Cer-
tain studies also show prices to be very close to Cournot equilibrium. 
Keywords  Cournot model, market power, game theory, electricity market reform, California elec-
tricity crisis 
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1. Introduction 
 
”It’s always been my dream to have a successful business. I’d like one day to open more 
stores, and maybe even expand into the provinces. But the conditions are very difficult 
to start a business. Taxes are very high and services are very limited. The electricity was 
out for eleven days last month, but I still had to pay for thirty days. And when I try to 
use a generator, the costs are so high that the customers stop coming. It’s very 
difficult.” 
― A man from Kinshasa, Congo on the Humans of New York blog (visiting Congo) on 
August 21, 2014 
 
Since the invention of the electromagnetic induction by Michael Faraday in 1831 and 
especially after the first electricity distribution systems introduced by Thomas Edison 
and Nikola Tesla in the 1880’s, electricity has played a vital role in the modern 
economy and the economic growth. Researchers are not unanimous about whether 
the relationship between electricity consumption and GDP growth is uni- or 
bidirectional, but about one thing they strongly agree: these two are inseparable (e.g. 
Payne, 2010; Chen, Kuo and Chen, 2007; Kraft and Kraft, 1978). One can easily agree; 
there are not too many things we could possibly do nowadays without electricity. 
Soon after the electricity generation and consumption became more common, the 
electricity generation, transmission, distribution and supply became national or 
regulated local monopolies. It was no earlier than in the late 1980’s when Chile and 
Great Britain opened the game towards competition. Electricity markets across the 
globe have experienced reforms ever since. With efficiency improvement as their goal, 
both developed and developing countries have eagerly introduced competition on 
their electricity markets. 
Nowadays strict monopolies are a minority and most of the World’s electricity markets 
are either fully or nearly liberalized to competition. Many countries (or in the case of 
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the US, states) have also organized their electricity market as a wholesale competition: 
generation is fully liberalized and megawatts are traded through a centralized spot 
market that sets an hourly (or half-hourly) price for electricity. Market participants are 
also free to make forward contracts with each other. Electricity producers, traders, and 
retailers have open access to the bulk transmission and local distribution networks, yet 
both networks are seen as natural monopolies even today, just often separate and not 
necessarily national ones as before. Finally, final consumers are able to choose from 
who and which generation company’s electricity they buy. 
Now everything looks good at the first glance, but can a traditionally monopolistic 
market easily be transformed into an actually competitive one? Are the wholesale 
electricity prices really on their competitive level meaning the marginal cost? 
According to wide research in different continents, the simple answer to both 
questions is: no. The best known example must be California in 1998-2000 (e.g. 
Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2002), where market power 
exploitation, combined with exceptional conditions, lead to astronomical wholesale 
prices. 
So the power generation indeed generates power. “Market power” simply means that 
the market price is above the marginal cost of the last unit of output introduced to the 
market. Market power is said to be unilateral whenever a firm can affect the market 
price with its own decisions, given the actions of its rivals. Research (e.g. Puller 2007) 
has shown that rather than participating in tacit collusion, electricity generators abuse 
the unilateral market power they have. Neither have the competition authorities found 
evidence of coordinated actions among generators to raise prices in violation of the 
antitrust or competition law (e.g. Wolak 2005). The exercise of unilateral market 
power is the main reason for a costly market failure, and it appears to be significantly 
higher in the electricity supply industry than in other network industries (e.g. Wolak, 
2014). 
There are several explanations to this, most of which are a direct consequence of three 
forces: finance, physics and geography. First, there’s a necessity to balance the 
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electricity supply and demand at every instant: electricity is hard and so far very 
expensive to store1 and customers cannot be put to queue for electricity. The 
generation capacity is also constrained and, especially with the increasing amount of 
renewable energy, in risk of unexpected shocks. 
Second, the electricity must be carried from the generator to the consumer. The 
electricity flows in the transmission network according to the laws of physics rather 
than laws of economics: the network has its finite transmission capacity and its 
geographical constraints. When being congested, generators located far from the 
demand are not able to compete with those closer to demand. Borenstein, Bushnell 
and Stoft (2000) show that limited transmission capacity can give a firm the incentive 
to constrain its output in order to congest transmission on its dominance area. 
Furthermore, Joskow and Tirole (2000) find that holding financial and/or physical 
transmission rights2 enhances the market power of a generator at the importing node 
of the transmission line. And just like the generation unit, also the transmission line 
contains a risk to fail. 
The third is probably the most obvious reason: the small number of firms. Electricity 
generation typically involves a significant up-front investment to construct a 
generation unit, leading to unwritten entry barriers. Bigger generation units also often 
lead to economies of scale with lower per-unit fixed and variable costs. In the 
developed countries the demand doesn’t notably increase in the long run, and 
therefore switching from a monopoly regime into a competitive one doesn’t invite for 
investment. In contrast, in the developing countries the demand is highly increasing in 
the long run, but the countries lack investment. Wolak (2014) notes that the 
generation capacity ownership also tends to be concentrated in small geographic areas 
                                                          
1According to Wolak (2014), constructing significant storage facilities typically requires notable 
up-front investments and more than 1 MWh of energy must be produced and consumed to 
store 1 MWh of energy. 
2 Financial rights mean a “firm price” for transmission offered to market participants to protect 
themselves from fluctuations due to changes in demand, supply and transmission capacity 
(failures). Physical rights give the holder the right to use congested network interfaces. 
(Joskow and Tirole, 2000) 
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within the wholesale markets, leading to “local monopolies”, thanks to the 
transmission constraints. 
The fourth reason for market power to flourish in the electricity markets is rather 
independent from physics and geography: the inelastic, peaking demand. Demand 
varies constantly, peeks intraday and by seasons and is subject to sudden shocks 
caused by already mentioned plant or line failures, weather changes and “even the 
halftime break in a major sporting event” (Holmberg and Newbery, 2010). The main 
reason for such a steep demand curve is that consumers lack real-time metering and 
knowledge of their electricity consumption and electricity prices. In other words, they 
have no incentive to balance their demand. Joskow and Tirole (2006) also note that on 
some markets consumers may not be able to adjust their consumption freely even if 
they wanted to3. To change this, investments are again needed. 
When you add politics, independency / willingness to national self-sufficiency, spot 
and future markets, the power soup slowly begins to boil. Below I have constructed a 
figure representing my understanding of the cause-effect relationships behind the 
existence of market power in electricity markets. 
 
Figure 1: Forces behind the unilateral market power in electricity markets. 
                                                          
3 Joskow and Tirole (2006) note that the system operator might physically be unable to cut off 
individual customer loads and is forced to ration on a zonal basis instead. 
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The above introduction and figure show the complexity and broadness of the 
electricity market behind the unilateral market power research. Some parts of it 
(notably geographical and physical constraints and their consequences) cannot even 
be explained nor solved through economics. However, economics offers great tools to 
define the source of the market power more closely. After all, the market power 
settles somewhere in between the inelastic demand curve and the oligopolistic 
electricity production competition. Definition of this area is indispensable for any 
further actions to mitigate it. 
The aim of this thesis is not to solve the market power dilemma on the electricity 
market, but rather to show from where the unilateral market power economically 
arises. This is done through theoretical research, construction of a theoretical game, 
and presentation of previous empirical findings. The research question is simply the 
following: Why and to what extent does market power arise in power markets? 
The structure of this thesis is the following: first I will present my chosen theoretical 
framework or the Cournot competition model in chapter 2. I will then construct a 
Cournot-based, electricity market specific game in chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents some 
of the most significant empirical studies from the field of market power research 
supporting my theoretical findings. In chapter 5 I will conclude and give suggestions for 
future research. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
“We will make electricity so cheap that only the rich will burn candles.” 
― Thomas Edison 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are several unique characteristics that 
differentiate the electricity markets from others. Before diving deeper into these 
characteristics, however, I want to point out two things essential to our research, 
which simultaneously are prerequisites for any market power research: 1) the market 
produces one single good with no product differentiation and 2) the market is 
oligopolistic, with two or more, yet few producers. 
The three most popular game theoretical approaches to the market power in 
oligopolistic markets producing a single good are Bertrand model, Cournot model and 
Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) model. All of them model non-repeated, or one 
period interaction of competing oligopolists. I will now present each of them shortly 
and explain why I chose the Cournot model beyond the others to play the role of the 
theoretical framework for this thesis. 
In the Bertrand model firms take the demand as given and compete in price with the 
idea that “if my rival lower’s his price, I lower my price”. Naturally both output and 
price are chosen to maximize the profit. The Bertrand model is very suitable for tacit 
collusion and cartel behavior research, or even for analyzing unilateral market power 
on a market with very low marginal costs. However, this is not the case for the 
electricity markets, where marginal costs are often sharply increasing and the 
generation capacity limited. 
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983, cited in Tirole 1988) also investigated a two-stage 
Bertrand game where firms first choose quantities simultaneously and once they’re 
aware of each other’s capacities, they choose their prices. Kreps and Scheinkman 
(1983) proved that when firms 1) face a concave demand function, 2) follow an 
efficient rationing rule (customers with the highest willingness to pay will be served 
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first) and 3) have arbitrary investment costs, the two-stage Bertrand game gives the 
same results as a one-stage Cournot game. Therefore there’s no need to include a 
deeper presentation of the Bertrand model to this point of this thesis. 
Whereas in the Bertrand model firms compete directly in price, in the Cournot model 
they compete primarily in quantity. This means that smaller the number of the firms, 
more they have power in affecting the market price by increasing / decreasing their 
outputs. Now this is exactly what the unilateral market power is about: each firm's 
output decision affects the good's price. No wonder the Cournot model is one of the 
most used ones for modeling market power in the electricity markets and therefore I 
have also chosen it as the theoretical framework for this thesis, to be presented more 
closely in the following subchapters. 
Next to the Cournot model, the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) is the other one of 
the most used tools to analyze market power in the electricity markets. Contrary to the 
Bertrand and Cournot models which originate from the 19th century, the SFE approach 
was originally presented only a bit over two decades ago, in 1989, by Paul Klemperer 
and Margaret Meyer. In the SFE model firms compete in both quantity and price, and 
instead of choosing an optimal output, they choose their optimal offer curve 
considering the different demand curves they face. 
Out of all three models SFE is the most complex with a set of differential equations to 
solve and offers multiple equilibria instead of only one. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) 
further argue that all supply curve equilibria are bounded by the Cournot and Bertrand 
outcomes, so that when the demand is static, any equilibrium between Bertrand and 
Cournot is possible, Cournot outcome including most market power. Due to its 
complexity SFE is closer to reality and is therefore preferred for instance in ex-ante 
analyses predicting prices (Ventosa et al, 2005). 
Willems, Rumiantseva and Weigt (2009) for their part find that Cournot and SFE offer 
equally adequate results on market power on the German electricity market. They 
further suggest using the Cournot model for short-term analysis for model’s ability to 
accommodate additional market information, such as network constraints, and the SFE 
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model for long-term analysis since it is less sensitive to the parameters selected. Some 
researchers prefer the SFE over Cournot (see e.g. Baldick, Grant and Kahn, 2004), and 
some of the empirical studies presented in chapter 4 have indeed used the SFE as their 
ground theory. However, as we are not constructing a simulation model in this thesis, 
it is sufficient for us to understand the fundamentals of the market power, and for that 
it is sufficient to understand the Cournot model. Therefore I have left a closer 
presentation of the SFE model for others. 
It is also very common to evaluate the extent of market power through different 
concentration indices, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). However, on a 
market such as electricity with highly volatile, inelastic demand, significant short-run 
capacity constraints and extreme storage costs even firms with small market shares 
could still exercise significant market power (Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2002; 
Borenstein, Bushnell and Knittel, 1999). Wolak (2005) also notes that several 
wholesale electricity markets have been subject to severe market power problems 
even when they had HHIs that would not raise market power concerns on any other 
industry. Concentration measures incorporate no information about the (in)elasticity 
of demand, which plays a crucial role on the electricity markets. Therefore I have left a 
closer presentation of market concentration indices out of this thesis as well. 
 
2.1 Cournot Model 
 
I will now present the theoretical framework of this thesis, the Cournot model. The 
model was named after the French mathematician and philosopher Antoine Augustin 
Cournot (1801-1877) who presented his original duopoly model in his book Researches 
on the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth published already in 1838; 
interestingly, around the same time as the electromagnetic induction was invented. 
One period Cournot model is the basic model of unilateral market power. A firm has 
unilateral market power when it can, with its own decisions, affect the market price. In 
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the Cournot model, each firm does so by choosing their optimal output to maximize 
their own profit. While the basic Cournot model is a static, one period model, it 
doesn’t mean that unilateral market power wouldn’t last longer. However, the 
unilateral market power doesn’t depend on whether firms face each other on the 
market repeatedly or not, and therefore there is now no need to build a dynamic 
model. 
To use the Cournot model the market in question has to fulfill the following 
assumptions: 1) there is more than one firm and all firms produce a homogeneous 
product, meaning there’s no product differentiation; 2) the number of firms is fixed; 3) 
firms act strategically and seek to maximize profit given their competitors' decisions. It 
is easy to see that a wholesale electricity market fulfills all of these criteria: there is no 
real product differentiation and due to high up-front investments the number of firms 
can be seen as fixed even in the long term. Profit maximization is somewhat natural for 
any market. 
The model further assumes that 4) firms compete in quantities and choose them 
simultaneously; 5) firms do not cooperate, meaning there is no collusion; 6) firms have 
unilateral market power: each firm's output decision affects the good's price. The 
model will tell us prices, quantities and profits as functions of cost structures, the 
demand function and the number of firms. 
The Cournot game must always end in Nash equilibrium. When each player is assumed 
to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players and no player can benefit by 
changing its strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged, the set of strategy 
choices and the corresponding payoffs create a Nash equilibrium. 
I will begin with a throughout presentation of a duopoly model as it is the easiest to 
model and understand. I will then shortly widen the Cournot model to an   firm case. 
Although most of the wholesale electricity markets consist of more than two 
generation firms, the duopoly model gives us all the necessary information in the 
easiest possible form. It also works as a basis for the electricity market specific model I 
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have constructed in the next chapter. The following mathematical presentation is 
based on Tirole’s (1988) book. 
 
2.2 Cournot Duopoly 
 
Let’s consider a duopoly where two firms,   and  , choose their output quantities 
simultaneously. Firm  ’s profit function is the following: 
  (     )     (     )          
where    and    are the quantities produced by each firm,  (     ) is the market 
price taking into account the total quantity produced and        is the cost function of 
the firm  . This function is said to have the exact Cournot form. 
Further following Tirole’s (1988) path, we assume the profit function    to be strictly 
concave and twice differentiable in   . This naturally means that the profit is 
maximized at the point where the first-order condition of the profit function    is 
equal to zero: 
  
      (     )    
         
 (     )     
As Tirole (1988) notes, the first two terms yield the profitability of an extra unit of 
output, which is equal to the difference between price and marginal cost. The third 
term for its part represents the effect that the extra unit of output has on the 
profitability of inframarginal ones. The extra units produced create a decrease in price 
  , which affects the    units already produced. This can be interpreted as the negative 
externality between the firms: when choosing its output, firm   takes into account the 
negative effect of the market price change on its own output    instead of the 
aggregate output      . This leads to an outcome where each firm tends to choose 
an output that exceeds the optimal aggregate output from the industry’s point of view. 
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In short, the market price will be lower than the monopoly price and the aggregate 
profit will be lower than the monopoly profit. 
Although the price is lower and the output higher than in a monopoly case, neither 
reaches the competitive level. Tirole (1988) also points out from the same equation 
that the Cournot equilibrium does not equalize marginal costs   
  except in the case 
that firms are symmetric. From the welfare point of view the aggregate output is too 
low and furthermore the industry’s cost of production is not minimized. 
To observe the Cournot equilibrium price more closely, we can rewrite the first-order 
condition for profit maximization as followed: 
   
  
 
  
which is defined as the Lerner index for firm  : 
   
     
 
 
 
This is the famous Lerner index, also known as the price-cost margin. It is constructed 
from the following elements: 
   
  
 
  
which is the firm  ’s market share, where         is the total output of the 
industry, and 
   
  
 
  
 
which is the elasticity of demand. Thus the Lerner index is proportional to the firm’s 
market share and inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand. This index 
measures the degree to which prices exceed marginal costs. Whenever the price   is 
higher than the marginal cost   
 , the index is positive, meaning that the firm possesses 
market power. In a competitive case price would equal the marginal cost and thus the 
index would give 0; closer the index is to 1 (=monopoly), more the firm has power. In 
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the Cournot equilibrium the index is always positive and therefore the Cournot 
equilibrium is not socially efficient. 
What have we learned so far? The Cournot equilibrium settles between the monopoly 
equilibrium and the competitive equilibrium: Cournot profit is lower than the 
monopoly profit but higher than from a competitive market (price is higher than 
marginal cost yet lower than the monopoly price) and therefore each firm can, with its 
own production decision, affect the market price. Also the cost of production is not 
minimized except in a symmetric firms’ case. This altogether means that the Cournot 
equilibrium is not effective either from the industry’s point of view or from the social 
point of view. Simultaneously, it enables the firms to obtain greater profits than from a 
fully competitive market and offers consumers greater profit than a monopoly. 
Following Tirole’s (1988) example, I note a few more technical details important for 
our further analysis. The second-order conditions with respect to    and    are the 
following: 
   
     (     )    
          
  (     )  
and 
   
    (     )     
  (     )  
Now we want the profit function to be concave     
     and the quantities produced 
by each firm to be strategic substitutes     
    . Recall that     . For the latter one 
it then suffices the inverse demand function to be concave        . Beyond that, the 
profit function to be concave we need the firm’s cost to be convex    
       These 
assumptions seem pretty obvious and are met for instance for linear demand 
       , which we will be using both in the following example and the model 
constructed in the next chapter. 
As we can now assume the profit function    to be strictly concave and twice 
differentiable in   , we obtain a reaction curve    with the following definition: 
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This implies that as firms choose their quantities simultaneously, each of them takes 
the output of their rival as given and bases their output decision (reaction) on that. The 
objective of each firm’s output decision is to maximize profit given the quantity chosen 
by the other firm: 
  
 (         )     
When the outputs are strategic substitutes (meaning zero product differentiation) such 
as electricity, firm  ’s profit is decreasing with the other firm’s quantity and therefore 
the reaction curves are downward sloping. We’ll look more closely on this once we’ve 
derived the Cournot equilibrium. 
I hereby derive the results obtained by Tirole (1988). As he shows, the Cournot 
equilibrium can easily be derived in the case of linear demand and cost. Let’s decide 
the demand function to be          (or more usefully, in the inverse form 
        )  and the cost function            . 
By replacing the above definitions to the first order condition function, the quantity 
chosen by the  ’th firm (or the reaction function) then becomes: 
     (  )  
       
 
 
 
and by symmetry: 
          
       
 
 
 
By replacing the    in the first function by its definition (the second function) we 
obtain the Cournot equilibrium: 
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Again replacing the definitions of inverse demand and cost, this time to the original 
profit function, and with a little help from the   ’s definition, we finally get the Cournot 
duopoly equilibrium profit for the firm  : 
       
  
          
 
 
 
 
It is understandable that the firm’s output    decreases with its marginal cost   . This 
implies that an increase in firm  ’s marginal costs    decreases the firm’s output, or 
(and now we get back to the reaction curves as promised) shifts the firm’s reaction 
curve down. What is more interesting, is that the firm’s output increases with its rival’s 
marginal cost   . The explanation is rather simple: as the firm   faces higher marginal 
costs, it decreases its output    which leads to a larger demand faced by the firm   
(recall that the total quantity demanded must be satisfied by these two firms alone as 
       ), encouraging it to produce more. 
As Tirole (1988) notes, this outcome can be obtained for a more general demand and 
cost functions, as long as 1) the reaction curves are downward sloping (quantities are 
strategic substitutes), 2) there exists a unique Cournot equilibrium (the reaction curves 
cross only once) implying that the slope of    in the (     ) space is smaller in absolute 
value than the slope of   4. This is visualized in the following figure. From the same 
figure we see that if the firm  ’s output decreases (the reaction curve shifts down), the 
rival firm  ’s output increases (moving upwards on firm  ’s reaction curve to find a new 
equilibrium). 
 
                                                          
4 To find out more about this ”stability condition” you may study the chapter 8 on Tirole’s 
(1988) book. 
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Figure 2: Reaction curves5. 
 
2.3 Cournot with   Firms 
 
I will now shortly go through the Cournot equilibrium for more than two firms again 
following the steps of Tirole (1988). This is of course a more realistic case, and the 
outcome of the model when   approaches infinity further strengthens the reliability of 
the Cournot model. 
Let the total number of firms now be  , forming again the total output  : 
  ∑  
 
   
 
 
The first-order condition of the  ’th firm’s profit function now becomes: 
  
         
         
        
                                                          
5 Now       and      . The figure retrieved from Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cournot_competition, on August 31st, 2014. 
18 
 
The Lerner index or the price-cost margin remains the same: firm’s market share 
divided by the elasticity of demand. If we assume all firms to be identical, with linear 
demand          and linear cost            for all   (with the condition of 
   ), the profit maximization equation becomes: 
              
As the total quantity     , there are altogether     “ ”s in the previous function, 
leading us to the equilibrium output per firm: 
  
   
   
 
 
and further helping us to define the market price: 
            
   
   
 
 
After a few twists and turns we again obtain the profit per firm: 
  
      
      
 
 
Both the market price and each firm’s profit decrease with the number of firms  . 
Thereby it follows that the aggregate profit    also decreases with the number of 
firms. And now comes the beautiful part: when the number of firms approaches 
infinity (   ), the market price approaches the competitive market price or the 
marginal cost  . Thus, the Cournot equilibrium with a large number of firms is close to 
a competitive market. This makes sense: as there are many firms on the same market, 
each has very little power on the market price and therefore acts almost as a price 
taker. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
 
This basic Cournot model is pretty much identical to any school book presentation, and 
for a good reason: it is a great tool to understand the basics of unilateral market power 
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on any oligopolistic market. It helps us to visualize why the market price on such 
markets is in between the competitive and the monopoly price, why everybody is 
better off than in their worst case scenario and vice versa. No wonder the Cournot 
model has maintained its popularity since almost two hundred years. 
However, as nothing is perfect in this World, neither is the Cournot model. When 
observing it from the electricity market point of view, probably the biggest concern 
arises from the demand side assumptions. In the Cournot model the demand and the 
elasticity of demand are taken as given, whereas in reality the demand is very volatile 
and especially during its peaks very inelastic. These are obviously also the moments 
when the abuse of market power most easily takes place. However, a peaking demand 
curve is pretty impossible to model ex ante. 
Other electricity market specific defects of the basic Cournot model have to do with 
marginal costs and capacity. First, marginal cost of electricity is rarely linear, but rather 
varies by the technology chosen and the size of the generation unit in question. It is 
often lower for base load and higher for peak load. Most of the generation 
technologies don’t allow smooth and complete adjustment, but only the option to 
have the generation unit to be on or off. A generation unit is also always constrained 
by its maximum production capacity, which means that it cannot be adjusted to very 
high demand peaks. This means that the capacity is not elastic, and cannot be adjusted 
as easily as in the Cournot model. 
Finally, as any model, also the Cournot model is based on strong assumptions: not only 
the demand and its elasticity, but also the rival’s strategy is taken as given. The 
capacity decisions are made simultaneously, and what happened in the previous 
period has no effect on the decisions in this period. This sounds to be pretty far from 
the reality, where rivals’ decisions are rather impossible to predict without collusive 
behavior and where history always plays a certain role, in this case both in technology 
(if we had a generation unit running in last period, it might be as costly to keep it 
running for zero profit as it would be to turn it off) and in human behavior. Borenstein 
and Bushnell (1999) agree with this and note that it is possible for firms to learn over 
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time to compete less aggressively with one another. According to them, the repeated 
interaction gives firms more power to punish non-cooperative rivals and therefore 
leads to less aggressive competition. Needless to say, this would further increase 
prices and lead to lost consumer welfare. 
Furthermore, the Cournot model being static cannot address issues such as entry or 
exit, nor the issue of sales that take place through forward or futures contracts. The 
first one isn’t such a problem on the electricity markets due to low (and slow) level of 
entry. However the future market of electricity is an interesting topic that has raised 
contrary opinions among researchers about whether it is good or bad for market 
power mitigation (see e.g. Wolak, 2014; Allez and Vila, 1993; Ausubel and Deneckere, 
1987 and Gul, 1987). This is an important subtopic we are not able to tackle with the 
chosen model. 
In the next chapter I have constructed a more electricity market specific, simple game 
theoretical model based on the Cournot duopoly theory, in which I try to tackle as 
many of the defects discussed above as possible. 
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3. Duopoly Power Game 
 
“Electricity is really just organized lighting.”  
― George Carlin 
 
Electricity generation typically involves significant up-front investments to construct a 
generation unit. These fixed costs together with variable costs differ between energy 
sources and production technologies, usually associating lower variable costs with 
higher fixed costs and vice versa (Wolak 2014). Therefore different generation 
technologies have very different marginal costs. As Holmberg and Newbery (2010) 
state, the production cost of a plant is primarily determined by fuel costs and its 
efficiency, nuclear and hydro-power having the lowest marginal costs. Understandably 
plants with peak capacity are the most expensive ones: for instance open-cycle gas 
turbines burning natural gas or oil have low fixed, yet high variable costs (Holmberg 
and Newbery, 2010). 
I have here constructed a very simple, electricity market specific duopoly model. 
Assume now that we have two kinds of generators: base load and peak load ones. Coal 
is used for base load generation thanks to its low marginal costs,      . Peak load 
generation is done either using natural gas with      , or even more expensive 
diesel oil, with        . Each firm will always apply the cheapest technology 
available first. All technologies allow the generation unit to be running either on full or 
zero capacity, meaning both our capacity and marginal costs are nonlinear. 
Furthermore, the capacity is not only nonlinear, but also constrained: the total 
capacity of the market is four generation units,     , and there is no chance to 
construct more of them (due to high up-front investments meaning fixed costs which, 
for simplicity, I have left out of this analysis). 
Now all the above assumptions are very strong, yet quite realistic for the electricity 
market. What is not quite realistic is the linear demand curve. However, it would not 
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be useful to model a realistic demand curve of electricity that is dependent of so many 
economically unpredictable variables (such as weather) and often very inelastic. 
Therefore I have followed Cournot’s example and assumed a linear demand 
         or in the inverse form         . 
Now I have constructed five different settings of a similar game, each to be presented 
in the following subchapters. The assumptions (above) and the basic idea is the same 
in every setting: there are two electricity generation firms on the market, each of 
which has two generation units (resulting in market’s total capacity      as defined 
above). Now the only thing that changes is the marginal cost of the capacity, or the 
generation technology and its distribution between the two firms. Each firm can 
choose to run either 0, 1 or 2 of its generation units. Following the one-period Cournot 
game firms choose their outputs simultaneously and make their decisions based on the 
demand curve and the assumed strategy of their rivals. It further follows that as the 
marginal costs and their division change, the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) changes. 
On each of the following subchapters I have constructed a graphical presentation of 
the market (note that the demand curve and maximum capacity remain the same in all 
three models), as well as a payoff matrix to see all the possible profits for both firms in 
all possible outcomes, and of course to easily point out the Nash equilibria. 
 
3.1 Identical Firms, Pure Base Load 
 
In this first setting I assume the whole capacity      is generated through coal, 
which has low marginal costs     . As we can see from the graph on the left hand 
side, no such a thing as competitive market equilibrium exists on this market (demand 
  and marginal cost    don’t cross): the demand or the willingness to pay is so high 
that the duopolies will make profit with each unit of output even if they decide to run 
all of them. Now both firms   and   have two identical generation units each, and each 
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with low marginal costs. On the right hand payoff matrix I present the possible 
outcomes of each individual strategy. 
 
Figure 3 
 
Now it is easy to see that there are three Nash equilibria in this game: when (   ) 
choose to run either (2,1), (1,2) or (2,2) generation units (profits are (4,2), (2,4) and 
(2,2) equivalently), the price   setting to either 2 or 3. 
Although we cannot obtain the competitive market equilibrium with our assumptions 
in this setting (not that it would be our goal either, but for comparison), the Nash 
equilibria obtained here are also the closest possible to it: either all or the majority of 
the capacity will be in use. Note that both firms would obtain equal profits higher to 
the full capacity strategy if both ran only one generation unit. This is the joint 
monopoly or the tacit collusion outcome. However we can see this is not a Nash 
equilibrium and therefore not a valid outcome for this game. 
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3.2 Non-identical Firms, Base and Peak Load 
 
Now I have modified the previous setting a little bit. Firm   still has two base load units, 
so for that part, his situation remains unchanged. Firm  , for his part, now has one base 
load unit and one peak load unit, the latter running with natural gas in 3.2.1 and with 
diesel oil in 3.2.2. 
 
3.2.1  Cheaper Peak Load 
 
The graphical presentation of the market as well as the payoff matrix may be seen 
below. 
 
Figure 4 
Now the competitive market equilibrium could be achieved with the same outcome as 
in the previous model, this time being a real competitive market equilibrium with 
marginal cost and demand functions crossing at    . However, as the matrix shows 
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us, this is not the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, there are now two Nash equilibria 
(compared to three in the previous game) in this game: when (   ) choose to run either 
(2,1) or (1,2) units, giving payoffs of (4,2) and (2,3) equivalently. Either way, three 
generation units will be running for market price    . 
 
3.2.2 More Expensive Peak Load 
 
Now let’s see what happens when the marginal cost of the peak load unit rises fro 2 to 
2,5. 
 
Figure 5 
Now it is clear that there’s no point to run all four units, as the fourth one would result 
in negative marginal revenue. Furthermore, the only Nash equilibrium of this game is 
obtained when (   ) choose to run (2,1) units, giving payoff of (4,2) equivalently. Just 
like with the cheaper peak load unit, three generation units will be running in 
equilibrium for market price    . 
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3.3 Identical Firms, Base and Peak Load 
 
Let’s again combine the previous settings in a new way. Just like in 3.1 we now have 
two identical firms. However this time both firms have one base load unit and one 
peak load unit each. Following the structure in 3.2, in the first game the peak load 
units run with cheaper natural gas and in the second setting with more expensive 
diesel oil. 
 
3.3.1 Cheaper Peak Load 
 
Once both firms have one generation unit running with natural gas, the graph and the 
payoff matrix get the following forms: 
 
Figure 6 
 
This time we again have three Nash equilibria: when (   ) choose to run either (1,1), 
(2,1) or (1,2) generation units, with equivalent profits of (3,3), (3,2) and (2,3). The price 
now settles to either 3 or 4. 
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3.3.2 More Expensive Peak Load 
 
The following figure and payoff matrix show the equivalent results for more expensive 
peak load. 
 
Figure 7 
Now this gets interesting: in this game the only Nash equilibrium is the strategy of both 
firms running only one single unit, giving profits of (3,3). This is equal to tacit collusion 
or joint monopoly equilibrium. I will discuss this finding along with the previous ones in 
the next subchapter. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
This game could be further developed in several different settings. However, the 
games played above give us all the information we needed. The most important thing 
observed here is the effect of marginal costs on firms’ profits. Compare for instance 
the first and last games, or 3.1 and 3.3.2. In the first one the Nash equilibrium is 
obtained by any strategy (excluding the strategies where either one would fully refrain 
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from the competition) except the one with least output (1,1) and highest equal profits 
of (3,3). In contrast, in the last game played this strategy of one unit of output each 
yielding profits of (3,3) is the only Nash equilibrium. 
Simply put: more expensive the generation gets, fewer incentives the firms have to use 
it, more market power they have and closer to joint monopoly profits they get. As the 
generation units get more expensive, it is easier for firms to know each other’s 
strategies without collusive behavior; the same strategy of one unit each with profits 
(3,3) could have been obtained already in the first game, but not being Nash 
equilibrium it was not sustainable and therefore not a realistic outcome of that game. 
In the last game however both can be sure of the other one offering only one unit of 
output to the market. Similar results can be found when comparing 3.2.1 with 3.2.2. 
Furthermore, similar results would be obtained even with the cheaper peak load 
capacity if the demand was even slightly lower. 
All the games played above support the theory presented in chapter 2 stating that the 
Cournot equilibrium settles in between the competitive and the monopoly one. When 
looking at the payoff matrices, you may note that more expensive the capacity gets, 
higher the market price of electricity arises: with pure base load it settles between 2 
and 3, with one peak load unit to 3, and with one peak load unit each between 3 and 4 
or in the case of the more expensive peak load, directly to 4. This means that with 
higher marginal costs further from the competitive equilibrium and closer to the 
monopoly equilibrium we move. This sounds reasonable: as long as we have cheap 
capacity, it literally pays off to answer to high demand. Less payoff per extra unit of 
output we get, less interested we are to fulfill the high demand, knowing the amount 
of market power we have. As the duopolies have their market power, they have every 
reason to use it for their own benefit. 
In the classical Cournot model the raise in rival’s marginal costs raises the firm’s profit 
through raising the demand it faces. Although our setting is a bit different with the 
constrained capacity and non-linear marginal costs, the outcome holds: for instance in 
both 3.1 and 3.3.1 (when firms are identical) the average payoff from the Nash 
29 
 
equilibria is 2,67 for each firm. On contrary, as soon as firm   has higher marginal costs 
than  , as is the case in 3.2.1, firm  ’s average payoff from the Nash equilibria falls to 
2,5 and  ’s arises to 3. This makes a lot of sense. 
Just like the Cournot model, this game points out the existence of market power and 
the causes enforcing it. How much of market power there actually is in every game is 
based on strong assumptions of the demand curve. Once the demand is known and 
other parameters (for instance weather, raw material costs and energy imports) are 
controlled, the only remaining variable to define is the capacity decisions: how much 
of the withholding of capacity is done for maintenance and how much for 
“maintenance”?  
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4. Empirical Evidence 
 
“Enthusiasm is the electricity of life.”  
― Gordon Parks 
In this empirical part I have handpicked some of the most relevant cases and studies 
on market power in electricity markets in the United Kingdom during 1990-2001 and 
California during 1998-2000.  Note that not nearly all of the studies are run through a 
strict Cournot model. Instead, I have constructed a discussion between different 
approaches. However, once variables such as policy implications and weather are 
controlled, most of the studies find at least partial evidence in favor of unilateral 
market power and Cournot pricing on both markets. 
 
4.1 Early Case: UK 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) was the second country worldwide to open its electricity 
market for competition, right after Chile. It has therefore been under close observation 
of market power researchers. Although the British electricity market hasn’t 
experienced any notorious crisis after its reform (unlike California, to be discussed in 
the following subchapter), several researchers have still found loopholes (and their 
abuse) in the strictly regulated power market. It is also a great example of an electricity 
market where the concentration indices haven’t worked at all for successful price 
prediction. I have here collected some of the most relevant research articles observing 
roughly the first decade of Britain’s reformed electricity market. 
Prior to 1990, a single government organization called the Central Electricity 
Generation Board (CEGB) was the only owner of all the generation plants and the 
countrywide transmission system. The CEGB’s only customers were the 12 
government-owned Area Boards which distributed electricity to all end-use customers 
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within their local districts in England and Wales. In April 1990 the Area Boards were 
converted into private Regional Electricity Companies. 
CEGB for its part experienced bigger transformation: transmission was separated to its 
own company and the generation was divided between three firms, of which National 
Power and Power-Gen originally possessed around 80 % of the market, a share that 
dropped to 55 % by 1996 and to 25 % by 2001 (Bunn and Martoccia, 2005; Wolak and 
Patrick, 2001; Wolfram, 1999). Meanwhile the two largest generation firms steadily 
reduced their generation capacity, many smaller existing power producers increased 
their capacities and several independent power producers entered the market. The net 
effect of the deletions and additions to capacity in this market was a decrease in the 
total generation capacity serving the market despite growing electricity consumption 
over this same period (Wolak and Patrick, 2001). More interestingly, the strong decline 
in market concentration didn’t decrease the electricity wholesale price. 
For the first decade after the market reform, all wholesale electricity in Britain was 
traded through a central pool. The transmission network company was responsible of 
the pool administration. The pool operated as a spot market for electricity for the first 
11 years after the market restructuring, giving a half-hourly price for the electricity 
traded. It also matched supply and demand in real time, maintained the network 
frequency, voltage and stability, managed network constraints and administered 
financial settlements between buyers and sellers (Wolfram 1999). In addition to the 
large generators and independent power producers, also Scottish and French 
generation companies sold electricity to the pool. From 2001 upon the pool was 
replaced by New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA), voluntary bilateral trading. 
The studies cited below apply different theories and methods and use slightly different 
data sets. Therefore the exact results include some variation. However about the big 
picture they largely agree: as the concentration of the British electricity market 
decreased, the market power abuse increased. From the beginning of the reform until 
1996 there is slight evidence of unilateral market power exercise, which was however 
kept modest thanks to strict regulation. From 1996 until 2000 the behavior of the firms 
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had rather collusive characteristics: the market concentration kept falling but the 
prices remained steady. Early in 2001 the electricity prices as well as the price-cost 
margin fell significantly although the market structure didn’t notably change. This 
suggests that tacit collusion may have broken down once it was known that the pool 
would soon be history. 
Prior to the market reform, Green and Newbery (1992) predicted high levels of market 
power exercise by the duopolists. Later on Wolfram (1999) makes a detailed analysis 
of the early years of the reformed market and shows that generators exercised less 
market power from 1992 to 1994 than predicted by Green and Newbery (1992).  As 
data she uses over 25 000 observations on prices obtained from the National Grid 
Company and half-hourly quantities from six months every year from 1992 to 1994, as 
well as marginal costs of generators from the same time period, including fuel price 
and weather information from secondary sources. Although the observed price levels 
fell far short from what the profit-maximizing oligopoly models had predicted, she 
indeed finds clearly positive price-cost margins for every time period studied, telling 
about the existence of market power. She finds evidence both for regulation-
responding behavior and entry deterrence. 
Supporting Wolfram’s (1999) findings, Wolak and Patrick (2001) study the first four 
years of the restructured electricity market. They use half-hourly market-clearing 
prices and quantities, and the half-hourly bids submitted from the British electricity 
market. Their interest is to know whether the new market structure has been able to 
eliminate significant profit-making opportunities for generators. They find that the 
prices had mostly been maintained close to competitive levels; however the two 
largest producers had been able to temporarily obtain spot prices much higher than 
the average cost of supply through withholding of capacity for short time periods on a 
daily basis. 
Wolak and Patrick (2001)  further note that this market power activity leads to prices 
in excess of marginal and even average costs only for time periods as short as two or 
three half-hour load periods within one day. They also find that the days in which the 
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high-priced half-hour load periods occurred tended to follow one another in the same 
week. As a result of this action, the profits of National Power and Power-Gen didn’t 
decline in direct proportion to their decreased annual electricity output and market 
share. Their findings directly support the use of the Cournot model for high demand 
periods. 
In contrast to Wolak’s and Patrick’s (2001) findings, Green (2004) believes the 
opposite. He tests whether the British generators were withholding capacity in order 
to raise prices above competitive levels. He states not to find any evidence of market 
power abuse and even suggest that a Bertrand competition would be more suitable 
more market power research on electricity markets than the Cournot one. 
I dare to disagree. Although the information sources Green (2004) uses seem accurate 
(he uses information on load factors6 before and after restructuring published by CEGB 
and Monopolies and Mergers Commission, as well as hourly load-duration curves 
provided by the National Grid Company), the time unit chosen (a full year) seems little 
accurate to me. I do agree with his statement that the evidence for large-scale capacity 
withholding is weak, yet it is the same as Wolak and Patrick (2001) formerly made. 
However the market power existence is as fast moving phenomena as electricity itself, 
and therefore such a general approach seems little valid and even less comparable 
with Wolak’s and Patrick’s (2001) half-hourly findings. 
All researchers agreed that, no matter whether market power was formerly abused or 
not, the continuous fall in market concentration should translate into declined 
electricity prices. However this was not the case. 
Sweeting (2007, 2001b) studies the second half of the decade by testing the static 
Nash equilibrium assumption, or our beloved Cournot theorem. Using residual demand 
functions for each player, he finds a significant change in behavior in late 1996. He 
states that prior to this the generator behavior was consistent with the static Nash 
equilibrium assumption, taking into account that most of the output (70 %) was 
                                                          
6 If the generation unit is up and running every moment of the year, its load factor is 100 % 
(Green, 2004). 
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covered by financial contracts which hedged prices from rising excessively high. After 
1996, instead of the static Nash equilibrium assumption, the firm behavior and prices 
were closer to a repeated game tacit collusion. What makes this interesting is that an 
obligation to keep prices low expired in April 1996 and as part of it, the divestiture of 
capacity completed in July 1996. This further supports Wolfram’s (1999) findings about 
regulation-responding behavior. 
The graph below represents the monthly average price-cost margins based on prices 
paid by generators. According to the graph generators exercised less market power 
during the low demand summer months and more market power in every month in 
1998-1999 than in 1995-1996. 
 
 
Figure 8: Monthly average price-cost margins in the UK electricity market 1995-
2000 (Sweeting, 2007). 
 
Bunn and Martoccia (2005) study the changes in electricity prices from the whole 
decade constructing a microsimulation model of agent bidding behavior. The 
electricity prices in Britain did not fall at all during the 1990s despite the massive 
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changes in the market structure. However the prices did fall by some 25% in 2000-
2001, although no remarkable market structure or market share changes occurred 
(Bunn and Martoccia, 2005). Their research supports the above referred findings of 
Wolfram (1998) and Sweeting (2007, 2001a) about the National Power’s 
regulation-constrained exercise of unilateral market power in the early years. Bunn 
and Martoccia (2005) further suggest that as the market concentration declined, 
the unilateral market power gradually turned into coordinated, tacit collusion in 
the later years. 
 
4.2 Extraordinary Case: California 
 
Inspired by early-movers such as the UK, California reformed its electricity market in 
1998. Prior to deregulation, Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) used the Cournot model to 
examine different scenarios, assumptions and issues concerning the organization of 
the Californian electricity market. They calculated the Cournot equilibria at several 
demand levels for six selected hours in four different months to include seasonal 
variations in available hydro energy, gas prices and relative regional demand levels. As 
a comparison, they also calculated the price that would have resulted if all firms acted 
as competitive price takers. 
This is what they found: “Absent significant divestiture of assets by incumbent 
producers, the restructured California electricity generation market could have a few 
large producers each of which would potentially find it profitable to restrict output to 
raise price. […] The simulation recognizes that large firms might have an incentive to 
restrict output to raise price.” And this is exactly what occurred. 
California’s electricity market, and especially the crisis it experienced at the change of 
the millennium, must be the most known worldwide. California began to open its 
federal electricity market during the second half of the 1990’s and the market was 
formally opened in April 1998. Towards the end of the decade the price of natural gas 
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increased, a heatwave hit the area causing the demand for electricity to peak and 
drought to the Pacific Northwest states, further causing decrease in imports of 
electricity to the California state. Needless to say, the conditions were perfect for 
unilateral market power to raise its head (and high). 
At the same time the fact that the generation and wholesale prices were liberalized 
and the retail prices capped led electricity wholesale prices to exceed retail prices. This 
made the wholesalers unwilling to pay their bills, making the generators unwilling to 
provide them energy. The whole mess ended up as broad, consequent blackouts that 
affected tens of thousands of people and finally the bankruptcy of Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company, one of the state's largest energy companies. 
The following graph represents the hourly wholesale prices of electricity in California 
from April 1998 until November 2000. According to Joskow (2001), wholesale 
electricity prices in California increased by 500% between the second half of 1999 and 
the second half of 2000. As the conditions enhancing the unilateral market power were 
directly price-increasing as well, several studies have been made about the extent of 
the market power’s role in the wholesale price formation. 
 
Figure 9: The hourly wholesale prices of electricity in California from April 1998 until 
November 2000 (Puller, 2007). 
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The following figure from Joskow (2001) displays the difference in reported outages 
between 1999 and 2000 for October and November. The proportional shares of 
intended and scheduled outages got arguments and counter-arguments from 
generators and California government (Joskow 2001). Whatever the proportions are, it 
is clear from the figure that the quantity of generation capacity being out of use was 
excessively huge at the end of 2000 compared to the same period previous year. 
Joskow (2001) further notes that from November 2000 until May 2001, as much as 
35% of total capacity of the generating capacity in California was not in service and 
was unavailable to supply electricity during this period, which is  approximately twice 
the typical historical forced and planned outage rate. 
 
 
Joskow and Kahn (2002) construct a simulation model of competitive benchmark 
wholesale prices for electricity in California during the summer of 2000. Their research 
differs from several others by its data: instead of using confidential data available only 
to the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) or to the California Power 
Exchange (PX), Joskow and Kahn (2002) use public data provided by Environmental 
Figure 10: The difference in reported outages between 1999 and 2000 for October 
and November (Joskow, 2001). 
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Protection Agency, Continuous Emissions Monitoring System and Western Systems 
Coordinating Council. They control the increased electricity demand and natural gas 
prices, and the decreased imports of electricity from other states, as well as the impact 
of changes in the prices of nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions permits on estimated 
competitive benchmark prices for electricity. They further compare these prices to the 
actual, occurred prices. Their research states that whereas all the mentioned variables 
explain the high wholesale prices to a certain extent, the higher NOx permit prices and 
their interaction with reduced imports have a particularly large impact on competitive 
benchmark prices. From the remaining fraction of the price exceeding marginal costs 
they indeed find strong evidence of market power abuse, not surprisingly in the form 
of withholding capacity. 
Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) follow the methodology developed by Wolfram 
(1999) cited in the previous subchapter and simulate a perfectly competitive market 
from 1998-2000 and compare those prices to actual prices. They decompose wholesale 
electricity payments into production costs, inframarginal competitive rents, and 
payments resulting from the exercise of market power. They use data on the 
unconstrained PX7 day-ahead electricity prices from June 1998 to October 2000. They 
find near-competitive pricing during the lower-demand months of the first two years 
and in contrast heavy departures from competitive pricing during the high-demand 
summer months. Furthermore, in summer 2000, wholesale electricity expenditures 
were $8.98 billion up from $2.04 billion in summer 1999. They state that even a 
perfectly competitive California electricity market would have seen wholesale 
electricity expenditures triple between the summers of 1998 and 2000, but agree with 
other researchers on the unarguable existence of market power: “We find that 21 
percent of this (price) increase was due to production costs, 20 percent to competitive 
rents, and 59 percent to market power” (Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2002). 
Borenstein’s Bushnell’s and Wolak’s (2002) research also supports my previous 
theoretical findings that market power is most commonly exercised during peak 
                                                          
7 The PX ran a day-ahead and day-of market for electrical energy utilizing a double-auction 
format Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002). 
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demand periods. The intertemporal variation in the ability to exercise market power is 
something characteristic for an unstorable good such as electricity. Furthermore, “the 
problem is exacerbated in electricity because demand is very inelastic in the short run, 
and supply becomes very inelastic as production approaches the system-generation 
capacity” (Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2002). 
Wolak (2003) finds results similar to Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) when 
observing market power on a firm level. He uses the actual bids submitted to the 
CAISO’s real-time energy market to measure the unilateral incentives of California’s 
five largest electricity generation companies8 to exercise market power in the state’s 
wholesale market during the summers of 1998 to 2000. Wolak (2003) uses the inverse 
of hourly ex post residual demand elasticity faced by each of the five biggest firms to 
measure the extent to which each of them is able to raise the hourly real-time energy 
price above its marginal cost. He finds significantly higher values for this measure of 
unilateral market in 2000 relative to the corresponding firm-level values in the 
previous years. 
Although all the researchers sited above (along with pretty much everyone aware of 
the California electricity crisis) agree on the existence of some form of market power 
during the crisis, Puller (2007) sharply notes that there is less understanding of the 
type of oligopoly pricing that led to the exercise of market power. He remarks that 
different oligopoly pricing models could have existed in California during that time, not 
only unilateral market power but also tacit collusion. The inelastic residual demand 
faced by individual firms provides the ability to unilaterally raise prices, whereas the 
daily repetition of the bidding game between a small set of firms combined with very 
accurate information about rivals’ costs (largely available on the Internet at the time) 
would have facilitated tacit collusion. Puller (2007) therefore tests whether firm-level 
production behavior was more consistent with unilateral market power or tacit 
                                                          
8 AES-Williams, Reliant, Duke, Southern Energy and Dynegy, which together accounted for 
about 50 % of the market. (Puller 2007) 
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collusion. Furthermore, he analyzes the extent to which higher prices resulted from 
less competitive pricing behavior rather than less elastic demand or higher costs9. 
Puller (2007) analyzes the competitive behavior of the five largest firms, who together 
counted for about 50 % of the in-state production capacity in California during the 
crisis. He uses hourly firm-level data on output and marginal cost of production and 
estimates the hourly residual demand function faced by the five large firms using the 
known supply of the rest of the generators, as well as PX day-ahead energy price (80-
90% of all transactions occurred in the PX during the time from April 1998 to 
November 2000). He gets similar results to Joskow (2001): each of the five large 
generating firms withheld output when price exceeded marginal cost. Puller (2007) 
further compares the actual wholesale prices to competitive pricing (perfect 
competition, the intersection of marginal cost and residual demand) and joint 
monopoly (or perfect tacit collusion, giving same results as an actual monopoly; the 
intersection of marginal revenue and marginal cost) pricing. Note that this is exactly 
what we did in the theoretical chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. And so are Puller’s (2007) 
results: “I find that actual prices are between the two benchmarks.” 
As such prices can arise from different oligopoly strategies, Puller (2007) further 
constructs a methodology to test whether the actual prices were closer to efficient 
tacit collusion or static non-cooperative behavior, meaning the Cournot competition. 
For this purpose he estimates both the dynamic and the static first-order conditions. 
The dynamic model easily rejects efficient tacit collusion by two or more of the firms. 
In other words, firms were pricing far below the joint monopoly prices, as the figure 
below shows10. 
                                                          
9 Price-cost margins can vary due to both supply and demand side factors: demand can 
become more or less elastic and firms can engage in a more or less competitive oligopoly 
pricing game. Therefore the rise in price-cost margins during the crisis could have resulted 
from firms behaving similarly on a less elastic demand function or firms behaving less 
competitively. (Puller 2007) 
10 Puller (2007) experiments with two functional forms, constant elasticity and quadratic, to 
estimate sensitivity. The joint monopoly price is very sensitive to the shape of residual demand 
at very high prices and therefore different functional forms give different results. 
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Figure 11: Competitive, actual and monopoly prices of electricity in California in 2000 
(Puller, 2007). 
 
The following figure for its part represents the simple average of five largest firms’ 
price-cost margins each hour11. If the firm is producing at full capacity, its margin is set 
to zero. The figure shows that price-cost margins vary considerably over the whole 
period and are higher during the third and fourth quarters of each year, when total 
demand for electricity is high. These results are in line with Borenstein, Bushnell and 
Wolak (2002) who find the largest differences between price and marginal cost during 
the summer months and above all in 2000. 
                                                          
11 Puller (2007) notes the following: “I emphasize that these margins are not scarcity rents 
because these are differences between price and marginal cost when firms have excess 
capacity. (…) The margins are not interpreted as measures of profitability because firms incur 
other on-going costs such as the cost of starting up a generator. Rather, these positive margins 
are measures of non-price-taking behavior because the units I analyze have already incurred 
the startup costs yet fail to utilize capacity when price is above marginal cost.” 
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Figure 12: Average price-cost margins of five largest generation firms in California 
1998-2000 (Puller, 2007). 
 
Puller (2007) finds that pricing was approximately Cournot for 3-412 of the 5 firms 
during most of the 1998-2000 period. Even when allowing firms to have individual 
conduct parameters, the hypothesis of Cournot pricing remains (Puller, 2007). Puller 
(2007) says this to suggest that the large variation both in prices (Figure 9) and price-
cost margins (Figure 12) was driven by changes in the size of residual demand faced by 
the five large firms with incentives to exercise market power, rather than by changes in 
the oligopoly pricing game. As a defect of his broad study, he notes that the empirical 
model is not capable to test for inefficient tacit collusion nor any other form of 
                                                          
12 Puller (2007): “When I allow for heterogeneous conduct parameters from June-November 
2000, I fail to reject Cournot pricing for AES, Duke and Reliant. However, Southern and 
Dynegy’s conduct parameters, ˆθ = 1.46 and 2.39 respectively, are statistically higher than 
unity. I cannot rule out the possibility that these two firms are engaging in some form of tacit 
collusion between firms with asymmetric cost structures as discussed earlier. However, there 
are strong reasons to believe that Dynegy’s conduct parameter is biased upwards because I do 
not have data on the output from its peaking units.” 
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dynamic pricing that would sustain prices between the Cournot and efficient collusive 
prices. 
To sum up, it is easy to agree with Wolak (2010): the exercise of unilateral market 
power is not a long-term problem. As the retail electricity prices in California were 
liberalized and began to rise in June 2001, wholesale prices began to fall. By the end of 
August 2001 wholesale prices had fallen 90% from December 2000, to the level 
preceding the crisis (Joskow, 2001). However, enormous amounts of economic harm 
had already occurred in a relatively short time period. 
 
4.3 Discussion 
 
Although the British electricity market was practically a duopoly at the beginning of its 
reformed history, it was well regulated and therefore the wholesale electricity prices 
didn’t notably rise at any point. On the other hand, even after notable fall in market 
concentration the prices remained unchanged, giving researchers reasons and data to 
believe that tacit collusion took place. 
In contrast in California, the electricity crisis experienced was extensive for several 
reasons favoring unilateral market power abuse: due to the weather conditions the 
import level of hydroelectric energy was lower and the demand higher. Simultaneously 
natural gas experienced a price increase. Researchers are unanimous about the 
existence of market power exercise, but of the extent there are competing results. The 
capacity withholding in California during highest demand periods was extensive, which 
supports the Cournot competition. For instance Puller (2007) finds that, all other 
variables controlled, the actual prices were very close to the Cournot equilibrium. 
On neither market was the market power a constant phenomenon, but instead took 
place during certain hours of the day and certain months of the year characterized by 
even less elastic demand than the others. 
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Joskow (2001) concludes the idea well: “Since there is virtually no real demand 
elasticity yet in these markets, and during peak periods most demand is satisfied with 
purchases in the spot markets, it is evident that as demand grows and supply gets very 
tight, generators realize that a small amount of capacity withholding, even with 
moderate levels of concentration, can lead to large price increases.” 
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5. Conclusion 
 
“I've found out so much about electricity that I've reached the point where I understand 
nothing and can explain nothing.” 
― Pieter van Musschenbroek 
This thesis represents the basic Cournot competition model to understand market 
power in oligopoly markets. I also construct a simple game of two electricity 
generation firms with different capacity settings, showing how the firms benefit from 
increased capacity costs in the form of increased market power. I further represent 
two interesting electricity markets, the one in Britain and the other in California, and 
relevant empirical research on them to show how electricity oligopolies function in 
practice. Especially in California strong evidence supporting the Cournot competition 
can be found. 
As many researchers have noted, electricity market is a very fruitful one to study 
(especially ex post) due to high level of accurate information about prices, costs and 
demand. Likewise, many policy makers have noticed the importance of such research. 
To mitigate market power we must first understand it. I believe it is useful to use 
several different tools and theories to analyze the existence of market power: I don’t 
see Bertrand, Cournot and SFE as rivals, but rather each other’s supporters. Together 
with the market simulations and other market measures these tools provide us with a 
complete pack to tackle the market power issues. Furthermore, their extensive 
application is essential prior to any significate policy changes. If there’s one thing we 
can learn from the California’s crisis, it is patience: electricity markets contain so much 
power that no reform should be made prior profound market research and adequate 
regulation. 
Several researchers cited in this thesis have published their own views on most 
efficient tools for this. I would like to point out two things worth focusing on: 
regulation and demand side motivation. Too often is “liberalization” or “deregulation” 
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misleadingly used as a synonym for the market reform. Introduction of competition to 
the former monopoly regime doesn’t automatically make a market competitive. 
Knowing the physical, geographical and financial constraints of the electricity markets, 
I dare to doubt whether perfectly competitive markets can ever be obtained. 
Therefore adequate regulation is needed. How to do this in such a way that existing 
and new firms still have enough incentives to operate in the market? Undoubtedly 
perfect regulation is as difficult to obtain as perfect competition. 
The other point, demand side motivation, is perhaps easier to mathematically model. 
No matter the theory applied, the researchers are unanimous about the fact that the 
inelastic demand is a key player in giving space for market power to be exercised. Less 
elastic the demand is, stronger the market power gets. Some unpublished research 
(see e.g. Kahn and Wolak, 2013; Wolak, 2006) have found empirical evidence that 
customers can respond to short-term wholesale price signals if they have the metering 
technology or even the knowledge to do so. Wolak’s (2006) experiment supports this 
hypothesis holds whether the customers are industrial, commercial or private and, in 
the case of private consumers, the raised elasticity does not significantly depend on 
their income level. 
A great thing about the demand side motivation for more elastic demand is that it is 
independent from geography and physics, as the figure presented in the introduction 
shows. However it is largely dependent on financial resources. Furthermore, firms 
must be the market participant with best resources to develop real-time meters 
forward. Unfortunately they also have the least incentives to do so. 
In short, just like the electricity plays a role in governments’ development goals and 
individuals’ lives so are governments and individuals needed to play a role in the 
electricity markets. 
Further research topics are numerous. As the electricity markets as a whole are a bit 
more than 120 years old and as their reformed journey began only a few decades ago, 
the topic is still fresh with a long future to come. Furthermore the new emission 
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regulations, population growth and the current worldwide economic situation raise 
even more questions to solve. 
How big is the effect of the demand curve on the market power? Would the Cournot 
model still be successful in its predictions if the demand was more elastic? What are 
policy makers’ interests to mitigate market power? How will the increasing amount of 
electricity generation by individual households (such as solar panels) affect the extent 
of market power? How does the share of renewable energy affect the market power? 
These are only some of the numerous possible topics for future research. 
A lot has been learned from the reforms in UK, California and elsewhere, and a lot 
remains to be learned. Every market is different, every reform is different and 
therefore the outcome of every market reform is different. Therefore it is not possible 
to “copy-paste” any reform to any other market, no matter how perfect the outcomes 
obtained. Yet to make successful policies and even successful research, it is necessary 
to be aware of the surrounding world with its markets and researches. The aim of this 
thesis was to present one old and golden tool to understand the market power in 
oligopolistic electricity markets. I hope you have enjoyed as much as I did. 
 
  
48 
 
6. Bibliography 
 
Allez, B. and J.L. Vila, “Cournot Competition, Forward Markets, and Efficiency,” Journal 
of Economic Theory, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 1-17. 
Baldick, R., Grant, R. & Kahn, E. (2004), "Theory and Application of Linear Supply 
Function Equilibrium in Electricity Markets", Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 25, 
no. 2, pp. 143-167. 
Borenstein, S. & Bushnell, J.B. (1999), "An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for 
Market Power in California's Electricity Industry", The Journal of Industrial Economics, 
vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 285-323. 
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J. & Knittel, C.R. (1999), "Market Power in Electricity Markets: 
Beyond Concentration Measures", The Energy Journal, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 65-88.  
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J. & Stoft S. (2000), "The competitive effects of transmission 
capacity in a deregulated electricity industry", Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 31, no. 
2, pp. 294-325. 
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J.B. & Wolak, F.A. (2002), "Measuring Market Inefficiencies in 
California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market", The American Economic 
Review, vol. 92, no. 5, pp. 1376-1405. 
Botterud, A., Kristiansen, T. & Ilic, M.D. (2010), "The relationship between spot and 
futures prices in the Nord Pool electricity market", Energy Economics, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 
967-978.  
Bunn, D.W. & Martoccia, M. (2005), "Unilateral and collusive market power in the 
electricity pool of England and Wales", Energy Economics, vol. 27, pp. 305-315. 
Chen, S., Kuo, H. & Chen, C. (2007), "The relationship between GDP and electricity 
consumption in 10 Asian countries", Energy Policy, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 2611-2621. 
49 
 
Green, R. J. (2004), “Did English Generators Play Cournot? Capacity Withholding in the 
Electricity Pool”, MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Working 
Paper, no. 2004-010. 
Green, R.J, & Newbery, D.M. (1992), "Competition in the British electricity spot 
market", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 100, no. 5, pp. 929-953. 
Gul, F. (1987), “Cooperative Collusion in Durable Goods Oligopoly.” Rand Journal of 
Economics, vol. 17, no 3, pp. 404-415. 
Holmberg, P. & Newbery, D. (2010), "The supply function equilibrium and its policy 
implications for wholesale electricity auctions", Utilities Policy, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 209-
226.  
Joskow, P.L. (2001), "California's Electricity Crisis", MIT CEEPR Center for Energy and 
Environmental Policy Research, Working Paper, no. 01-006. 
Joskow, P. & Kahn, E. (2002), "A quantitative analysis of pricing behavior in California’s 
wholesale electricity market during summer 2000", The Energy Journal, vol. 23 , no. 4, 
pp. 1-35. 
Joskow, P.L. & Tirole, J. (2006), "Retail electricity competition," RAND Journal of 
Economics, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 799-815. 
Joskow, P.L. & Tirole, J. (2000), "Transmission rights and market power on electric 
power networks", Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 450-487. 
Kahn, M. E. & Wolak, F. A. (2013), “Using Information to Improve the Effectiveness of 
Nonlinear Pricing: Evidence from a Field Experiment”, Working Paper. 
Kraft, J. & Kraft, A. (1978), "On the relationship between energy and GNP", Journal of 
Energy Development, vol. 3, pp. 401-403.  
Payne, J.E. (2010), "A survey of the electricity consumption-growth literature", Applied 
Energy, vol. 87, no. 3, pp. 723-731. 
50 
 
Puller, S.L. (2007), "Pricing and Firm Conduct in California's Deregulated Electricity 
Market", The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 89, no. 1, pp. 75-87.  
Sweeting, A.T. (2007), “Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity 
Market 1995-2000”, The Economic Journal, vol. 117, no. 520, pp. 654-685. 
Sweeting, A.T. (2001a), “The Effects of Falling Market Concentration on Prices, 
Generator Behaviour and Productive Efficiency in the England and Wales Electricity 
Market”, MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Working Paper no. 
2001-003. 
Sweeting, A.T. (2001b), "Market Outcomes and Generator Behaviour in the England 
and Wales Wholesale Market 1995-2000", MIT Center for Energy and Environmental 
Policy Research, Working Paper, no. 04-013. 
Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Ventosa, M., Ba  llo,  .,  amos, A. &  ivier, M. (2005), "Electricity market modeling 
trends", Energy Policy, vol. 33, no. 7, pp. 897-913.  
Willems, B., Rumiantseva, I. & Weigt, H. (2009), "Cournot versus Supply Functions: 
What does the data tell us?", Energy Economics, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 38-47. 
Wolak, F.A. (2014), “Regulating Competition in Wholesale Electricity Supply”, in Rose, 
N.L. (ed.), Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned? NBER Book, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, pp. 195-289. 
Wolak, F.A. (2010), "Using restructured electricity supply industries to understand 
oligopoly industry outcomes", Utilities Policy, vol. 18, pp. 227-246. 
Wolak, F.A. (2006) “ esidential Customer Response to Real-Time Pricing: The Anaheim 
Critical-Peak Pricing Experiment”, Working Paper. 
Wolak, F.A (2005), "Managing Unilateral Market Power in Electricity", NBER Working 
Paper, no. 3691. 
51 
 
Wolak, F.A. (2003), "Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity 
Markets: The California Market, 1998–2000", The American Economic Review, vol. 93, 
no. 2, pp. 425-430. 
Wolak, F.A. & Patrick, R.H. (2001), "The Impact of Market Rules and Market Structure 
on the Price Determination Process in the England and Wales Electricity Market", NBER 
Working Paper, no. 8248. 
Wolfram, C. (1999), "Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot market", 
The American Economic Review, vol. 89, pp. 805-826. 
Wolfram, C. (1998), "Strategic bidding in a multi-unit auction: an empirical analysis of 
bids to supply electricity in England and Wales", Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 29, no. 
4, pp. 703–725. 
